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REVIEW ARTICLE
The Reasoning Game: Some Pragmatic Suggestions
Allan C. Hutchinson*
Cass Sunstein, Legal Reasoning And Political Conflict, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996, 220 pp, hb $25.00.
It seems like whole libraries or, at least, large tracts of them, have been written
about the mysterious concept and practice of legal reasoning. Although there
has been much toing-and-froing around the matter, the common wisdom still
prevails that, as Chief Justice Coke put it in the 17th century, there is an
'artificial Reason and Judgment of Law which requires long Study and
Experience before a Man can attain to the Cognizance of it.' By this, it is usually
meant that law has its own special form of reasoning that distinguishes it in
some important way from other disciplines and other forms of reasoning
(economic, scientific, logical, political, sociological, etc). Like all reasoning,
legal reasoning is a process of argumentation by which it is possible to infer
or move from one already accepted proposition to another that has yet to be
accepted. Of course, everyone agrees that legal reasoning is distinctive to the
extent that it works upon a particular set of materials (cases and statutes), is
framed in a professional jargon (eg, stare decisis and obiter dicta), and is
engaged in by a restricted community of professionals (lawyers and judges).
However, that is as far as any agreement goes. As central as it is to the whole
legal enterprise, the precise identity or nature of legal reasoning remains
elusive; it defies simple classification or easy analysis. As such, much
*
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contemporary jurisprudence remains fixated with clarifying and justifying the
operation and status of legal reasoning.
While most lawyers and judges continue to insist that 'legal reasoning has a
logic of its own ... [whose] structure fits it to give meaning to ambiguity,' 1 I
maintain that such a formalistic position is both untenable and unnecessary.
Shorn of its legal nomenclature and doctrinal dressing, legal reasoning is
simply a general and non-specific style of reasoning which lawyers have
colonised and at which judges have become particularly adept; the claim that
legal reasoning is special not only in its formal attributes, but also in its
ability to arrive at substantively better and worse answers cannot be sustained.
As a normative exercise, it is not an empirical matter of truth or falsity: legal
reasoning is less a demonstration of logical necessity and more a practice of
human justification. More particularly, legal reasoning is a mode of playful
and rhetorical activity. This insight has been latched upon as the basis of a
neo-pragmatic revival in jurisprudence. However, as exemplified in the
esteemed work of Cass Sunstein, these efforts to construe law and
adjudication as a practical activity flatter, but on ly to disappoint: the new
nonformalist packaging belies the old formalist commitment. In contrast, I
will offer a different understanding of legal reasoning that is thoroughly
pragmatic i n ambition and elaboration. I insist that adjudication, like much
of life itself, is best understood as a playful attempt by judges to engage in
a language game that seeks to regulate social life. By depicting
adjudication as a non-formalist game of infinite proportions, my account
seeks to explain and evaluate adjudication in such a way that it captures

its sense as a peculiar professional practice (in which it stands as
something of its own thing) and as a profoundly political undertaking (in
which it is organically related to the larger context of society). In this
way, it might be possible to realise that law is not so much a site that is
located aside or away from ordi nary life and that adjudication is not so
much an activity that can be appreciated as separate from ordinary li vi ng:
law is a part of, not apart from, life and adjudication represents one site
and way of playing the game of life.2
The essay is divided into six parts. First, I introduce the basic
orientation of Sunstein's pragmatic accou nt of law and his emphasis on
analogical reasoning and incompletely theorised agreements as the keys
to legal casuistry. In the next three short sections, I criticise the
limitations of Sunstein 's account analogical reasoning hides rather
than does away with the historical values and social ideas that energise
the law's operation; incompletely theorised agreements are not so
much under-theorised as under-agreed-to to do the work asked of
them; and the fixed precedential points that anchor legal reasoning
allow much more movement than suggested. The last two sections offer
a deconstructive account of 'play' that better captures the general
practice of legal reasoning at large. Resisting the tendency to
transcendentalise or divinise notions like 'play' by turning them into
metaphysical entities, I treat legal reasoning as playful moves in a
pragmatic game and trace the implications of this non-formalist
approach for the practical performance and theoretical justification

of the judicial craft. In short, I want to insist that, in law's language
game, there is nothing to ground play, but more play: there is no final or
privileged way to play law's game that explains and grounds all others
that is not itself a game.

The pragmatic gambit
Eschewing

the hubristic

aspirations

of natural lawyers and other

formalists, a new breed of pragmatists have sought to re-valorise law and
adjudication as a professional practice in which practical people pursue
practical ends through practical means.3 As a 'back to basics' movement,
legal neo-pragmatism is not so much a philosophy or methodology, but
more a way of professional life: it nurtures an existential ethic of inquiry
rather than inculcates a catechism of substantive outcomes. By treating
truth and correctness as experiential and experimental rather than apodictic
and apocalyptic, adjudication comes to be understood as involving
nurtured prudence, not revealed knowledge. While law remains a noble
calling under such a perspective, its practitioners are more artisans than
artists and more technicians than grand theorists; Cardozo, Holmes,
Learned Hand and Llewellyn are their heroes. Extolling the practical
virtues of intellectual self-discipline and traditional craft, legal pragmatists
conceive of law as being much more playful and practice-based than other
contemporary jurists. However, while appreciating that adjudication is a
kind of game, they do not have the confidence of their convictions in pushing

through on the subversive implications of their insight that legal reasoning is
all about 'making moves' in a finite game of infinite possibilities.
Cass Sunstein is at the forefront of this pragmatist revival. In Legal
Reasoning and Political Conflict, his professed ambition is to restore the
fadi ng, but vital faith in the worth and viability of the legal craft. While
legal reasoning is a rule-based practice, law is not exhausted by the existence
or application of rules; rules are an important resource, but they do not
themselves fix the distinguishing characteristic of legal thinking because
'ideal justice outstrips rules; it adapts the account to the particulars of the
case' (p 135). More fundamentally, law is about reason-giving as much as it
is about decision-making or rule-application. According to Sunstein, law
devlops by self-conscious attention to its argumentative structure as much as
by a formal consistency with substantive outcomes. Nevertheless, rules are
important because they 'sharply discipline the territory over which argument
can occur' (p 191). For Sunstein, the life of the law is the (ana)logic of its
own experience; there is method in the seeming madness of legal reasoning
that is peculiarly and especially its own. Lawyers should not be embarrassed
by their instinctive habits of mind or argumentative routines, but shou ld
recognise and celebrate their pragmatic force and dispositive power. While he
treasures coherence, Sunstein believes its demands are satisfied by much less
than a snug fit between the almost infinite range of concrete propositions and
their controlling abstract principles: law is neither wholly reducible to
unadulterated politics nor wholly inflatable into pure integrity. Under this
pragmatic calling, the judge is bound by an official tradition of legal

reasoning, but has room to experiment within its confines. While politics are
always involved in legal disputations, the judge can remain agnostic and act
in a uniquely and proudly legal way: law might be political, but it is not
merely political.
For Sunstein, therefore, the special method of the law is to be found
in its traditional reliance on analogical reasoning. While analogical
reasoning is pervasive in law and everyday life, 'analogical reasoning is
the key to legal casuistry' (p 32) and 'lies at the heart of legal thinking and
for good reason' (p 99); it has a distinctive structure and faces distinctive
constraints. Because analogical reasoning imposes a certain discipline, there
is less need for a widespread moral or political consensus. Indeed, Sunstein's
reliance on incompletely theorised agreements seems to have virtually
eliminated the need for any agreement on such issues. As the most
familiar means of legal reasoning, analogical reasoning ru ns neither
inductively from

particulars to

generalities nor

deductively from

generalities to particulars, but moves from particulars to particulars:
analogical reasoning is not syllogistic and scientific in form and function,
but is practical and probabilistic. The beauty of legal reasoning is that it
allows lawyers and judges to engage with political and moral values
without reducing law to an open-ended ideological debate and without
collapsing it into some other field of knowledge, like politics or economics.
Large-scale debate about controversial issues is avoided by the fact that legal
reasoning functions by relying on 'a set of practices, conventions, and
outcomes . . . [that] makes legal interpretation possible ... and sharply

constrains legal judgment' (p 13). This legal culture of syntactic and
substantive principles places off-limits certain deep conflicts over the
right and good as being too ideological and unsuited to legal resolution;
'the lawyer's questions have everything to do with constraints of
competence and role' {p 34) and 'there can be a real difference betwe
the legally correct outcome and the morally correct outcome' (p 92).
Sunstein's

account

of

how

analogical reasoning works is

fairly

uncontroversial but it is the claims that he makes for its operation that are
decidedly controversial in character. He highlights four steps in the
analogical process: ( I ) fact pattern has certain characteristics A, B, and C; (2)
fact pattern Y differs from X i n some; respects, but shares certain other
characteristics A, B, and C; (3) the law treats X ir a certain way; and (4)
because fact pattern Y shares certain characteristics with fac1 pattern X, the
law should treat fact pattern Y in the same way. Obviously, the application of
such an analogical process involves normative judgments about relevance and
valence in terms of the similarities and differences between fac1 patterns.
However, according to Sunstein, the legitimacy and genius of analogical
reasoning as a legal practice is that it 'will impose a certain discipline . . .
[suet that] there can be a real difference between the legally correct outcome
and the; morally correct outcome; the difference lies in the fact that
analogies will operate; as entirely "fixed points" in legal reasoning , whereas
many of these are revisabk in morality' (pp 91-92). Moreover, in
understanding analogical reasoning in thi5 way as the key manoeuvre in the
judicial repertoire of legal moves, judges 'need not, much of the time,

attempt to say much about large-scale social controversies' (p 195). In this
important sense, therefore, analogical reasoning is different from and preferable
to other forms of legal argumentation, such as resort to abstrac1 theories of
'wealth maximization' or 'natural rights', because it operates at a mud more
concrete and modest level and in a much less theoretical and piecemeal way:
it does not need to take a stand on such ideological and controversial
matters. A5 such, analogical reasoning is the most effective, legitimate and
just form of legal argumentation in that it achieves 'principled consistency, a
focus on particulars, incompletely theorised
operating at a low

01 intermediate

judgments and

principles

level of abstraction' (p 67).

The bulk of Sunstein's monograph is appropriately devoted to a rich
series o1 practical illustrations about the operation of analogical reasoning
and

the

legitimacy

of

incompletely

theorised

agreements.

He

demonstrates an enviably wide and subtle appreciation of the common law.
Indeed, the great strength of all his work is the lucid and concrete way in
which he makes and defends his jurisprudential claims; jargon is eschewed
and Sunstein works hard to keep his discussion accessible to the nonspecialist. However, despite the obvious appeal o1 this pragmatic and
relatively playful approach, the new pragmatism tends to be pragmatic in
the most non-pragmatic and, at times, almost anti-pragmatic way.
Although paying lip-service to the decidedly pragmatic qualities of
contextual sensitivity and prudential judgment, Sunstein is far too concerned
with discovering and defining The Way

Things

Really Are. By

demonstrating that 'analogical reasoning is the key to legal casuistry' (p 32)

he enlists pragmatism to complete the formalist campaign of demonstrating
that law is a self-sufficient system that can produce correct, determinate,
predictable and distinctly legal outcomes. This is a flat denial of the
pragmatist's belief that legal reasoning is not really about anything unique
or special at all. Indeed, from a more rigorously pragmatic perspective,
legal reasoning is what it is and what it is is historically contingent and
socially revisable. Legal reasoning is nothing more (and nothing less) than
how particular lawyers reason at particular times. While some modes of legal
reasoning lend themselves better to some tasks than others, this conclusion
entails a contingent evaluation of their practical utility in particular
situations. It does not involve fixing 'the nature of legal reasoning' because
it has none in any essential

01

lasting sense: there is no neutral or reliable

algorithm for legal decision-making or any other kind.

Beyond analogy
While it is true that the law is much more pragmatic and less analytical
than most contemporary theorists pretend or allow, it strains the bounds of
credibility to promote analogical reasoning as the underwriter of correct,
determinate and distinctly legal operations and outcomes. On the contrary,
although analogical reasoning plays an important and frequent role in
law's reasoning game, it is thoroughly indeterminate in practice and
consequence. Most typically, this indeterminacy will manifest itself where
fact pattern Y has more or less similarities with and differences from fact
pattern X. As no two cases are ever entirely the same or different, this

will occur almost all the time. For example, fact pattern X might be
comprised of characteristics A, B, C, D, and E, but fact pattern Y might
possess either A, B, C, and D or A, B, C, D, E, and F. In either case,
there is nothing internal to the process of analogical reasoning that can
determine whether the

existence of

one

more, less

or different

characteristic is sufficient to warrant treating fact pattern Y like fact
pattern X or not. Indeed, the addition or subtraction of one characteristic
might alter the collective meaning of the other characteristics: without C,
the remaining characteristics A, B, D, and E might take on a very
different significance and, with F, the characteristics A, B, C, D, and E
might amount to a very different whole. Also, it might happen that in
fact pattern X, a re-appraisal might suggest that its relevant characteristics
were not A, B, C, D, and E, but really were A, B, C, and D or A, B, C,
D, E, and F. For instance, once it is decided that a car is a 'vehicle' in
terms of the rule that there are to be 'no vehicles in the park', whether a
person on roller-blades is a 'vehicle' will depend on the presumed or
postulated purpose of such a rule is it intended to reduce noise, cut down
on traffic, protect the safety of pedestrians, etc?
In almost all circumstances, there will be a pragmatic embarrassment
of analogical riches. If good arguments are the touchstone of law and
its legitimate functioning, there are simply too many good arguments
for the pragmatists' peace of mind. In this situation, while fact pattern
Y has characteristics A, B, C, D, and E, there are two earlier fact
patterns W and X that were disposed of in entirely opposite ways;

fact pattern W has characteristics A, B, and C and fact pattern X has
characteristics C, D, and E. There is no way to compare the relative
cogency of the two competing analogical options without resort to
some values or principles that are extraneous to the process of
analogical

reasoning itself. 4 Yet analogical

reasoning does not

determine the result; it is only a testing device for the more important
political determinations that are made prior to and after analogical
testing occurs. At every stage, the judge is obliged to make resort to
the values and principles that analogical reasoning is intended to
finesse. Analogical reasoning is thereby debilitated by the same
weaknesses that afflict a rule-based account of law. In the same way
that it is never possible to simply 'follow the rules', because the
question of the relevant and precise rule and what following it entails
remains irresolvably contestable, it is also not possible to simply
engage in analogical reasoning, because the question of the relevant
and precise analogy and what following it entails remains irresolvably
contestable. Accordingly, in contrast to Sunstein, I do not believe that, in
deciding 'whether one case is analogous to another, we need not, much of the
time, attempt to say much about large-scale social controversies' (p 195);
analogical reasoning hides rather than does away with the historical values
and social ideas that energise the law's operation.
For analogical reasoning to be cogent and compelling, there must be
sufficient justification to warrant the inference that, because property X is
present i n one instance, it is present i n another. But there is no way to identify

or confirm through the logic of analogical argument itself that certain
characteristics are present or that any inference are warrantable. This is a
matter of imputation, not demonstration. Indeed, analogical reasoning must
be complemented and supplemented by resort to what Sunstein is most at
pains to avoid what he describes as 'large-scale social controversies' if it is
to make any sense at all. Conversely, with recourse to such external values,
his formalist-style claims about the 'real difference between the legally correct
outcome and the morally correct outcome' (p 92) ring hollow. Moreover,
because pragmatism is more ad hoc than a priori, any juristic attempt to
effect a more programmatic or systematic appeal to political or social values
ceases to be pragmatic. Like his pragmatic predecessors, Sunstein fails to
provide any guide as to how distinguish good from bad analogical reasoning.
On this crucial question, he is left with Levi's inadequate conclusion that 'the
determination of similarity and difference is the function of each judge' and
that 'legal reasoning tests constantly whether society has come to see new
differences or similarities.'5 While this strikes an agreeable note withi n a
non-formalist

approach, it

is

cold

comfort to

Sunstein's formalist

commitments. In short, while analogical reasoning is an important dimension
of legal reasoning, it cannot provide the vital grounding that the new
pragmatists suggest.
Unclear about whether analogical reasoning acts as a constraint on law
or whether law acts as a constraint on analogical reasoning, Sunstein and
other pragmatists are unable to overcome the criticism that the analytical
validity of the substantive outcome is not warranted by the analogical

form of the legal argument. It is not the force of Reason, analogical or
otherwise, that determines what is important and relevant in legal decisionmaking, but what is substantively reasonable and contingently acceptable
as a matter of practical reason. As such, the determinacy or correctness of
legal reasoning is not closed, but open and, therefore, is as much political
as it is legal. While there are constraints that exist and are experienced by
lawyers and judges, these constraints are less determinate and more
revisable than is conceded. Constraints are as re-interpretable as the
reasoning that they are intended to constrain. Of course, it is not that
there are not better or worse answers or even correct ones, but that
'there is never any "correct legal solution" that is other than the correct
ethical and political solution to that legal problem.'

6

Again, that is, of

course, 'correct' in the contingent and contextual sense that certain people
for certain purposes at a certain time and place are persuaded that it is
correct. A resoundingly pragmatic account does not deny the existence of
such a standard, but de-stabilises its status and grou nding.

Not so fixed
If Sunstein is to make good on this deficiency, his primary responsibility must
be to establish a distinctly legal standard against which to measure the
weighting of the various similarities and differences. He maintains that, as
judges' convictions about the meaning and importance of certain decisions
will warrant a certain priority in constraining the potentially open-ended
operation of analogical reasoning, there are certain defining moments or 'fixed

points' of legal precedent that require judges 'to square current judicial
decisions with previous judicial decisions that have stood the test of ti me' (p
82) and, therefore, 'real constraint on judicial discretion . . . comes from
precedent' (p 179). For example, the fact that all judges accept that certain
cases, such as Brown and Roe ,1 must be incorporated into any proposed theory
about the American Constitution emboldens Sunstein to maintain that 'legal
reasoning has a distinctive structure and faces distinctive constraints' (p 75).
However, while it might be possible to agree on a handful of fixed
precedential points, they would be so limited as to be of little practical use: any
attempts to enlarge this crucial category sufficiently for it to become
practically operative will meet sharp and sectarian political disagreement.
Moreover, even though Sunstein acknowledges that such fixed points 'do not
speak for themselves, and judgments about their meanings have large creative
dimensions' (p 82), it is difficult to understand how Brown or Roe have a
settled and shared interpretation capable of providing the necessary direction
and force to get analogical reasoning up and running. Both Brown and Roe
have been subjected to intense public attempts at interested interpretation and
represent a site for the manufacture of meaning as much as an adequate
grounding for its resolution. Moreover, as Brown and Roe aptly illustrate, the
genesis of these fixed precedential points is to be found in strikingly creative
and non-analogical judicial acts that break with existing legal traditions. and reorient the whole legal enterprise. For all his pragmatic protestations, Sunstein's
account and defence of analogical reasoning remains profoundly abstruse and
rationalistic in the sense that it is unsituated in the material circumstances of

history and is inured to their political dynamics: 'abstract universality' is
ditched, but only to be replaced by 'abstract particularity'. For a pragmatic
approach that is supposed to valorise experience and contextuality, there is
little appreciation that legal reasoning operates in the real world of historical
struggle or of how law does (and does not) change. For Sunstein, the only
experience and context that matters is the legal one: the experience of the law
is the life of its own (ana)logic. He makes no attempt to place Roe or Brown
in their larger social settings so that it might be possible to appreciate the
political dynamics of feminism and protest or the struggle for racial justice
that impinged upon the legal process. On his terms, legal change is nothing
more than the playing out of a legalistic game of analogical reasoning, with
victory going to the analogically fleet and agile of mind. The pernicious effect
of such a formulation is that legal change is not thought of as part of a sociopolitical process nor as even a pragmatic response to changing historical
conditions. Instead, it is viewed solely as the culmination of the internal and
irresistible force of legal reasoning. Notwithstanding many formalists'
opinions to the contrary, it is surely unpardonable for lawyers and law
professors to present themselves as the exclusive architects of legal and social
change. To portray the development of legal doctrine as being brought about
largely by dint of analogical reasoning is both dangerous and self-serving;
dangerous because it trivialises the vital role of popular struggle and selfserving because it conveniently portrays academics as the saviours of social
justice. On the contrary, analogical reasoning is mere prelude or postscript to
a political letter.

Legal change is as much about political action as it is about making good
legal arguments. Decisions like Brown and Roe become 'fixed poi nts' in the
shifting constitutional universe not because they are legally correct or
analytically sound, but because they are considered politically valid and
socially acceptable. The difference between Plessy v Ferguson 8 and Brown
has nothing to do with interpretive cogency or hermeneutical integrity i n
constitutional doctrine; analogical reasoning was not a decisive factor. It has
everythi ng to do with changing currents and concerns in the political context
that frame and condition such germi nal and disruptive judicial decisions.
Plessy ceased to be a fixed point on the constitutional compass because it no
longer enjoyed sufficient political confidence and

public support; its

perception as having an analytically weak or analogically suspect status was
beside the historical point. Rightness was a matter of social policy and
political persuasion, not constitutional law. Indeed, without abandoning his
cherished attachment to analogical reasoning and the discredited doctrine of
stare decisis, Sunstein would have been hard pressed to recognise Brown as a
sound or correct legal decision in the summer of 1954. Like many other
jurists, he would be thrown on the painful horns of the perennial formalist
dilemma-either he would have to renounce his legal faith if he was to
maintain his political bel iefs or he could hold fast to his legal faith and
accept the law's reactionary and, in that case, racist ethos.

Incomplete agreements
While it might well be the case that 'to argue from one factual situation and

to decide by analogy is a natural tendency of the human and legal mind,' 9 it is
not the be-all-and-end-all of law and it most certainly is not the hallmark of
legal practice that distinguishes it from moral, political or ideological
contestation. Indeed, it is only one part of law's repertoire of argumentative
moves. Moreover, far from being

insulated

from

large-scale

moral

controversies, analogical reasoning gains its intellectual purchase and practical
efficacy by virtue of its resort to social and political values. Sunstein
reluctantly concedes this, but insists that incompletely theorised agreements
function as 'foundations for both rules and analogies' (p 6). Such agreements
allow judges to ground particular outcomes in something more substantial
than their own legal instincts, but less demanding than a fully thought out
theory or consensus for their political convictions; 'while people diverge on
some relatively high-level proposition, they might be able to agree when they
lower the level of abstraction' (p 37). By reference to such mid-level
artefacts, he defends his claim that the legal arena does and should stand
separately from any political involvement. Accordingly, as well as being
pragmatically useful, incompletely theorised agreements allow judges to get
on with their task without having to take a definitive or Hercu lean stand on
deep political or moral values.JO In this way, Sunstein's championing of
incompletely theorised agreements not only serves to explain how judges
reach particular outcomes, but also illuminates the hallmark of a wellfunctioni ng legal system because they are 'an important source of social
stability and . . . enable people to l ive together to permit them to show each
other a measure of reciprocity and mutual respect' (pp 5 and 39).

Sunstein is quick to admit that, on occasion, disagreements can be desirable
and incompletely theorised agreements can run the risk of reaching an
outcome that is 'mistaken' (p 58) in situations where there may be widespread
agreement about general value-judgements, but the agreement is nevertheless
incompletely theorised. This, of course, prompts the query of why this
outcome must be considered 'mistaken' and on what basis it might be
possible for judges to subject incompletely theorised agreements to 'scrutiny
and critique' (p 59). Sunstein acknowledges that it would be foolish to deny
that some general theories sometimes get it right, and even more foolish to
suggest that incompletely theorised agreements warrant respect whatever their
content: 'except in unusual situations and for multiple reasons, general
theories are an unlikely foundation for judge-made law, and caution and
humility about general theory are appropriate for courts, at least when
multiple theories can lead in the same direction' (p 59). While this could be
interpreted as meaning that he is doing away with any foundation to legal
reasoning at all, it is more reasonable to assume that he is merely replacing
one foundation with another. Besides being the stuff of what good legal
decisions comprise, incompletely theorised agreements are positioned to
become Sunstein's contribution to the formalist task of determining 'the
crucial part of the lawyer's distinctive solution to social pluralism' (p 59).
For Sunstein, the need to make the system work on a daily basis is of
paramount importance; efficacy is treasured more than consistency or
candour. Indeed, he makes the telling suggestion that, where judges have
conflicting political frameworks, what is left unsaid can be as important as

what is said and that judges should keep silent so as to facilitate agreement
on outcomes in particular cases; 'silence on something that may prove false,
obtuse, or excessively contentious can help minimise conflict, allow the
present to learn from the future, and save a great deal of time and expense' (p
39). On the other hand, Sunstein also maintains that 'if judges ... have actually
agreed on a general theory, and if they are really committed to it, they
should say so' (p 44). One could be forgiven for asking how judges could
ever know they had reached agreement on such general theories in the first
place, if they took Sunstein's vow of silence. Perhaps Sunstein also wondered
about this when he later concludes that, 'in law, as in politics, disagreement
can be a productive and creative force, revealing error, showing gaps, moving
discussion and results in good directions' (p 58). While this assessment
seems to the jurisprudential point, it is an odd statement for someone who is
committed to demonstrating that judges can resolve 'large, contested issues of
social life' in a distinctly legal way rather than 'only on . . . a sectarian basis'
(p 42).
Even if one accepts Sunstein's claim that

incompletely

theorised

agreements can come to the rescue of analogical reasoning, he is still left
with severe problems to overcome. For instance, in Sunstein's world, two
judges may appeal to the same or different principles in order to energise
analogical reasoning, but, so long as they both lead to the same outcome,
there is no cause for concern. It does not matter why fact pattern X and Y
are deemed analogous; all that matters is that the dispute is resolved. Indeed,
Sunstein worries that any attempt to explain what general theory was decisive

might jeopardise the result. However, in this case, incompletely theorised
agreements are less facilitating adjudication and more concealing the actual
basis of each judge's decision. While one judge may view A as the relevant
characteristic, another may hold B to be. If, however, the justification for
why X and Y are held to be analogous is ignored, there is no possibility
for predicting whether L or M may also be analogous. Stare decisis
seems to have become so much un necessary baggage in the pragmatic
enterprise. Furthennore, a more serious problem wou ld arise when there
is no agreement at this more general level. Incompletely theorised
agreements can only be possible or viable, if both parties have at least
some reason for accepting the result in question. If there is none, the
judges are thrown back on their own political instincts. In such
circu mstances, the reliance upon incompletely theorised agreements as
'foundations for both rules and analogies' (p 6) seems hopelessly
inadequate. As is so often the case, formalist theories run out at the very
point where they are most needed.
In many ways, I do not disagree with Sunstein's claim that judges
are able to make doctrinal progress by developing incompletely
theorised agreements on controversial issues; it is a plausible and
sensible account of judicial practice. However, when it is appreciated
that Sunstein and I are engaged in very different jurisprudential
projects, it is difficult to understand how such an account can
ad vance Sunstein's am bitions. Whereas Sunstein is intent upon arguing
that law is a self-sufficient practice that

is significantly

more

constrained than political or moral argument and that can generate
detenninate and legitimate results, I want to offer a more critical account
in which adjudication is one more site to play politics. Consequently, it is
only when analogical reasoning is placed within a much broader and
more expansive non-formalist account of law and adjudication that the
operation of legal reasoning as a practical exercise in decision-making
can be fully grasped and appreciated. It is to that task that I briefly tum.

Playing the game
Efforts to utilise notions of 'game' and 'play' as devices for understanding
various aspects of human thought and behaviour have a distinguished
philosophical lineage. However, despite general agreement over the
relevance and utility of such notions, there has been little agreement on
the role and status that games, as it were, play in illuminating the human
predicament and advancing its critical analysis.

11

In entering this long-

playing contest, I want to take a very particular strategy and side. The
traditional stance towards games and play that passes from Plato through
Kant and Schiller to Huizinga and Caillois apprehends them as activities
that occur outside and in contrast to reason. Play is a feature of the
irrational side of life in which chance is opposed to necessity and is
beyond the ken of analytical knowledge; it is undisciplined and represents
an arbitrary, unmediated, exuberant, spontaneous, instinctual, chaotic and
unbou nded outpouring of emotion. In contrast to this tradition, I want to

take my lead from the more subversive work of Saussure and Derrida.
Rather than treat play as something that is to be set against or
distinguished from reason or work, I want to defend an understanding of
game-playing that combines both free-play and structure in a dynamic
appreciation of the judicial performance in law's continuing game. In
particular, I want to argue that, as far as the games of law and adjudication
are concerned, it is always the case that play and reason, rules and
discretion, and freedom and constraint go hand in hand; these are not so
much polar opposites or dichotomies as interdependent parts or forces that
both

energise

and

destabilise

the

adjudicative

challenge.

In

this

deconstructive approach, play is treated not so much as irrational, but more
as part of what it means to be rational: there is no Reason for settling
arguments about reason that are not themselves part of the game of
reasoning. 12
In a seminal essay, Derrida places the notion of play at the heart of the
deconstructive critique and the subversive claim that 'language bears within
itself the necessity of its own critique.'

13

He explains how the Western

philosophical tradition has driven itself to metaphysical distraction by its
insistence on compressing its thinking about the world into the strait
jacket of dichotomous opposites chance and necessity, reason and desire,
mind and body, etc. In particular, he concentrates on the ill-fated effort in
discursive studies to ground the distinction between structure and free-play
in 'a fundamental immobility and reassuring certitude . . . beyond the reach
of free-play.' However, in rejecting the possibility of a structured

foundation that is privileged over and controls play, Derrida is not
suggesting that there is somehow a free-play that happens outside of
structure and that itself controls structure. Derrida insists that, in matters of
human discourse, there is no question of choosing between, on the one
hand, a formalist interpretation the 'dreams of deciphering a truth or an
origin which is free from free-play' and, on the other hand, an anti-formalist
interpretation the affirmation of a free-play that tries to pass beyond the
dream 'of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of
the game.' Instead, what must be done is 'to conceive of the common
ground and the dijferance of this irreducible difference.' In other words, the
apparent full presence of totalising structure is only made viable and given
force by the threatening absence of a disruptive free-play in the same way
that the apparent full presence of free-play is only rendered threatening by
the pervasive absence of a stultifying structure. As Derrida states:
If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infinity of a field cannot be
covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field that is,
language and a finite language excludes totalisation. This field is in fact that of a game, that
is to say, a field of infinite substitutions in the closure of a finite ensemble. This field
permits these infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of
bei ng an inexhaustible field . . ., instead of bei ng too large, there is something missing from
it: a centre which arrests and founds the free-play of substitutions. 14

In terms of jurisprudence, this deconstructive stance can be put to great and
unsettling

effect

in

the

non-formalist

project.

In

the

adjudicative

performance, the structure of rules and the play of discretion interact and
feed off each other in the game of legal interpretation: play is the element of
the game that disrupts and destabilises the structured rules that constitute the

game. There is always a tension between order and disorder, freedom and
constraint, and determi nacy and i ndeterminacy that cannot be resolved by a
totalizing account or performance. For example, it is not possible to think of
or understand determinacy without i ndeterminacy: each plays off the other in
the relentless encounter that both makes meaning possible and prevents its
ultimate grounding. In this way, determinacy and indeterminacy in legal
interpretation can be understood as locked in a relentless historical struggle
for dominance that allows only temporary respites, but no final resolution or
ultimate balance. Determinacy is only realisable against an i nforming
background of indeterminacy and it is the possibility of determinacy that
gives the threat of indeterminacy any bite. Accordingly, legal meaning is a
simultaneous mix of the determinate and indeterminate. In Hartian terms, for
example, this translates into the acknowledgement that rules will be
experienced as having a core of accepted meaning and a penumbra of
uncertainty, but the identity of each will shift and change; what was once
thought to be at the core will become penumbra! and vice-versa. The relation
between core and penumbra cannot be described once-and-for-all: it is a
socio-historical artifact and cannot be reduced to a simple formula or
overarching narrative. 15 Whether particular interpretations of a rule are or are
not compatible is not the point. It is the fact that the question of their
compatibility is always open and contestable.
Both formalists (and their nihilistic critics) overlook the crucial insight that
meaning is found in the social interaction of freedom and constraint, not in
the privileging of one over the other. Whereas formalists, including the

pragmatic Sunstein, emphasise the stability and pre-dominance of structured
determinacy over the marginalised threat of a disruptive indeterminacy, antiformalists stress the unbounded play of an anarchic indeterminacy over the
stabilising force of a orderly determinacy. Both are mistaken. In contrast to
formalist claims, law's game of adjudication has no greater (or lesser)
legitimacy than that which its participants earn for themselves in their
performance and play. As practised by its mainstream operatives, legal theory
exists as a kind of a grand narrative or meta-discourse that is produced by
the discourse of law to validate its own status as a scientific discourse in the
sense that it possesses an objectivity and foundation that lies outside itself
and whose evaluative standards are adequacy, accuracy and Truth itself. In
short, jurisprudence exists to legitimate the rules of its own game. However,
there is no metalanguage or one way of playing the game that is intrinsically
or extrinsically capable of grounding and validating the conclusions reached
or the justifications used. 16 Legitimacy and, therefore, justice is not achieved
by judicial conformity to a set way of proceeding, but is something that can
only arise from within the adjudicative game itself and be generated by the
participants' own discursive practices and institutional interactions. The
correctness of any particular move is established through persuasion and
argument, not proof or demonstration; the difference between 'good' and 'bad'
moves is game-specific and must be judged within the game, even as the
rules are being reinterpreted. Legitimacy, therefore, is something that does not
precede or ground any judgment given, but something that follows or flows
from the rhetorical force of the judgment made.

Whereas formalist jurisprudence seeks closure and legitimacy by privileging
the passing as the permanent, anti-formalist efforts are too ready to dismiss
the fact that the adjudicative performance can only be made sense of as an
exercise in rule application rather than as an unbounded exercise in judicial
free-play. Nevertheless, this concession does not undermine the pragmatic
claim that the adjudicative performance is an entirely fluid and contingent
game in which 'anything might go'. While law is a game that is defined by
and through its enabling rules, it is a game in which everything is always a
move in the game and in which there is no way to make a move that is not
itself a move in the game. As an activity that it always beyond absolute
determination and never fully finished, adjudication not only passively
allows, but also acti vely encourage transformative and disruptive acts
because, without them, the game risks paralysis and irrelevance: 'the novelty
of the unexpected "move" . . . can supply the system with that increased
performativity it forever demands and consumes.'

17

In this way, the

adjudicative game is played both within and with the rules that constitute it as
a game; the limits of the game and the validity of acceptable moves within any
particular performance of the game are not established once-and-for-all, but
are provisional markers that are constantly being negotiated and re-negotiated
as the game plays on. What counts as a move within the game is a part of
the game, not apart from it.
In this deconstructive understanding, there are two aspects to play
indeterminacy and decision. Law's language game is a vast practice of
almost infinitely possible moves in which each player must come to a

decision as to which move to make. The moment and nature of the decision
made cannot be grounded in anything outside itself; there is no possibility of
an a contextual metric for closure. As Derrida puts it, 'the moment of
decision, as such, must be the consequence or effect of this theoretical or
historical moment, of this reflection or this deliberation, since it always
marks the interruption of the juridicoor ethicoor politicocognitive
deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it.'

18

In

simple

jurisprudential terms, the decision is never entirely explainable by or
reducible to the rule(s) of which it claims to be an application. A particular
performance or move cannot be detached from the general game itself
each can only be fully appreciated in the context of the other. It is the
subject or player that both occupies and fills the gap between the game's
indeterminate possibilities and the determinate decision made. As such,
judges do not stand astride the game, but are altered and shaped by the
game's limits as they play to re-construct those limits; they are
influenced by the present contours of the game as they influence the
game's continuing performance and possibilities. In formalist terms, there is
no final or enduring span between the game's general indeterminacy and
particular decisions that is not destabilised by the constituted and
constituting identity of the different players: indeterminacy 'is not simply
a moment to be overcome by the occurrence of the decision, . . . [but]
continues the decision and the latter does not close itself off from the
former.'

19

Politics is always present and irrepressible because general

indeterminacy both gives arise to and continues to permeate the particular

decision made.
By understanding the move from general indeterminacy in this way, it
should be clear why my approach is pragmatic as opposed to either formalist
or anti-formalist. It resists the conclusion that any decision is valid simply
because it is a decision; the idea that there is complete freedom to decide
makes no sense at all because it is only within a structure of constraints,
albeit thoroughly contingent and revisable in content and direction, that
decision-making can be comprehended as decision-making. Without some
formative structure or informing context, there would be no game as a
process of human engagement and reflection, but only a random collision
of thought-less movements. Indeed, the very notion of choice implies a
constrained context that identifies what is and is not being chosen
between. At the very least, a decision has to possess an important
element of cognition, even if the ultimate decision is to make an arbitrary
choice. Moreover, the choice is not, as anti-formalists suppose it to be,
between an ultimate rational grounding or a free-floating irrational grunt:
this is only to re-install the idea of universal Reason and another false
dichotomy between reason and non-reason. There are grounds of and for
decisions, but they are contingent and unstable: reasons can be given as to
why one decision is better than another, but these arguments are never
themselves guaranteed or vouchsafed outside the context of argument.
Consequently, legal reasoning is about the moves that are presently in
play and which structure law's reasoning game in such a way as to enable
choices between competing definitions of particular rules in light of their

general

indeterminacy.

However, while providing an argumentative

context for reasoning and definition, these moves are themselves being
contingently re-worked. As such, the rules of the reasoning game do not so
much constrain or cabin judges' room for manoeuvre as make it possible
and operational.
Legal reasoning, therefore, is primarily a practical activity, not an abstract
and arcane meditation on legal intelligence. Like most practical skills, it is
acquired by the experience of doing it and handed down from practitioner to
practitioner: it is about 'knowing the ropes'. Legal reasoning is not a series of
fonnulaic applications in an abstract space, but a functional engagement in
real time; it is not a philosophical reflection, but a practical activity; it not a
logical operation, but an exercise in operational logic. However, although it is
primarily an activity, it does not mean that it does not have a basic structure
nor that there are no basic guidelines to follow. Legal reasoning, therefore,
refers as much to an attitude or style of argu ment as to the techniques of
argument themselves. On these matters, I am in general agreement with
Sunstein. However, unlike Sunstein, I maintain that a good legal argument has
no essential hallmark that fixes it as 'good' outside of its particular context.
This explains why a good legal decision one day might be considered
unconvincing at a later time. This fact, of course, means that the 'soundness' of
any particular episode of legal reasoning is to be adjudged in terms of its
capacity to persuade other judges and lawyers in a particular community at a
particular time rather than its analytical approximation to some logical ideal of
argument; the fact that Brown is treated as a better legal decision than Plessy

is about its political value and acceptability, not its inherent argumentative
force and cogency. As such, therefore, while Sunstein rightly depicts legal
reasoning as comprising a repertoire of arguments that combine to sustain a
culture of legal reasoning, he fails to accept that those arguments and that
culture are themselves politically dynamic and not the stabilising force that he
and other neo-pragmatists insist. In this way, law and legal reasoning are
treated as not so much tools or databanks, but comprise performative activities
in the game of adjudicative interpretation.

Beyond craft

The traditional skills and techniques of the judicial craft are central to the
performance of this rhetorical practice. Nonetheless, while the learned knack
of using legal materials with adroitness and dexterity is not to be underrated,
the effect of such a limited depiction of lawyers' special and distinctive
expertise is that it can too easily be used to avoid the democratic
responsibility of justifying their power and authority by reference to the realworld pressure of getting the job done. For example, Sunstein defends a
modest version of professional craft as the learned ability to make intuitive
judgements about fixed points in the legal universe and to fathom ways to
render them consistent enough to let legal reasoning proceed. Apart from its
formalist underpinnings, this account glosses over the more ambitious claims
made for it. By i nsisting that good lawyering must tum on a regimen of
restraint and restriction in which 'a set of practices, conventions, and
outcomes ... sharply constrains legal judgment' (p 13), Sunstein turns

lawyering into an inward-looking and insular profession. This depiction of the
judicial craft artificially and unnecessarily cuts law and adjudication off from
the sustaining political context and rich historical resources from which they
gain their vigour and conscience with which they achieve their highest
democratic calling. Legal artistry demands more than technical proficiency:
political ideals must and do combine with professional discipline in the best
and most compelling performances of law's adjudicative game.20
When judges begin to understand themselves as rhetorical participants
in law's infinite language game, they become less troubled by law's
incorrigible indeterminacy and adjudication's openness. Indeed, disabused
of the formalist project's appeal, they might come to embrace those
features rather than resist them. In particular, once it is fully accepted that
law is a game of infinite possibilities, judges might abandon the beliefs
that law and adjudication are closed and determinate practices and that
openness and indeterminacy are to be feared. Of course, this does not
mean participants are free to do as they wish. They are always
participating within their extant context which they must struggle to
change as they play within its constraints. However, once aware of the
constructive nature of the boundaries, judges and jurists might realise that
it is less about looking and more about seeing. When it comes to law and
adjudication, it is people's vision that constrains them, not the legal
materials. In this sense, change is as much a matter of imagination as
anything else. However, such a realisation does not lead into the clutches
of the discredited anti-formalists. Pragmatic judges will appreciate that,

like pragmatic philosophers, their positive task 'is to fecundate [their]
analytical skills with dreams and to discipline [their] dreams with
analysis.' In striving to do this, judges will work with and through the
rules, but there will be no governi ng manual of rules: there is only the
continuing responsibility to dream and experiment in reasonable and
reasoned ways. And, of course, there are 'no rules and regulations for
dreaming reasonable dreams.•21
In going about this experimental work, judges will take a characteristically
pragmatic attitude towards the meaning and merit of past decisions; they
recognise that another way of understanding the past is to imagine a better
future for the present. Whereas formalist judges and jurists are conservative
in the sense that they respect historical continuity for its own sake and treat the
doctrinal past as the primary source of future enlightenment, pragmatic judges
seek to make a critical accommodation with the legal tradition by combining
heresy and heritage in a playful judicial style. As such, judges should consider
themselves neither formalistically bound to perpetuate the wisdom of past
decisions nor instrumentally free to craft future decisions; they work the
present space between the past and the future. In the experimental spirit of a
pragmatic critique, they might take seriously Holmes' aphorism that 'continuity
with the past is only a necessity, not a duty.'22 So informed, they might begin
to push through on the implications of the pragmatic insight that history and
its situated reason are not a foundation on which to build, but a resource-site
from which to draw: earlier decisions possess no free-standing or self-justifying
precedential value, but must continually earn their spurs afresh through dint of

their contemporary pertinence to new problems and contexts. Neither historical
longevity nor contemporary newness has particular valence in fashioning
present solutions to future problems. Understood in this non-formalist way,
judges will be entitled to be most satisfied with themselves and their work
when they are praised not only for the legal soundness of their work, but also for
the inventiveness and boldness of their proposals. Whereas the formalist mind is
'of a doctrinaire and authoritative complexion: the phrase must be is ever on
its lips,' a pragmatic judge is more 'a happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of
creature' who recognises both the appeal and responsibility of experimentation.
23

Paying attention to context and distrusting broad generalities, they must be

conscious of their imagination's limitations and guard

against

both

the

formalist tendency to translate personal insight into universal truth and the
anti-formalist willingness to resign themselves uncritically to their ideological
intuitions. Pragmatist judges do not have a license for whimsy or caprice, but
a responsibility to do the best that they can in difficult circumstances there is
and can be no better way.
Within this pragmatic frame of reference, the qualities of the great
judicial players in law's language game are not so different to those that
are exhibited by judges that are traditionally acknowledged as part of
law's judicial pantheon. While good judges are lauded for their technical
abilities in parsing cases and rooting out inconsistencies, great judges
are celebrated for their vision and inventiveness: 'dealing with great
tasks as play . . . is a sign of greatness. '24 Those judges that take most
seriously the experimental imperative are those that flaunt conventional

standards in the process of re-formulating them; their judgments are the
exceptions that prove the rule. Indeed, some of the great judges of the
common law tradition, like Benjamin Cardozo in the United States,
Alfred Denning in England, Lionel Murphy in Australia and Bertha
Wilson in Canada, are precisely those who refuse to be hampered by
customary habits of judicial mind. For instance, the lasting attraction of
Learned Hand's (in)famous judgment in Carroll Towing 'the barge
owner's duty . . . is a function of three variables: ( I ) The probability that
she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the
burden of adequate precautions. Possibly, it serves to bring this notion into relief
to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the i njury, L; and the
burden, B; liability depends on whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e.,
whether B<PL' 25 is not to be found in the substantive wisdom of the decision
and the fact that he did or did not get it right. Instead, from a pragmatic
perspective, its canonical quality ought to be found in the playful example that
he set by giving other judges the courage to follow their own experimental
convictions.
What makes Holmes, Cardozo, Denning, and Wilson into great judges is
much the same as what makes George Best, Dick Fosbury, Mohammed Ali
and Olga Korbut into great players: it is not whether they somehow got it
right, but that they played with a panache, a style that caught the imagination
and changed people's understanding of what it means to play the game. By
making novel moves, they play the game as much with the rules as within
the rules. Such pragmatic judges recognise that law is not something to be

mastered, but is an infinite game of transformation in which experimentation
and improvisation are valued above predictability and faithfulness to existing
rules and ideas of what it is to play the game. At its most audacious, this
style of judging demands 'the willingness to stay in play, stay with the flux,
without bailing out at the last moment. . . [and] in keeping alive that
indefiniteness, that possible-who-knows-when, may be-soon, maybe-now,
that sense of working on thin ice, without assurance, keeping the play in play,
keeping the exposure to the abyss in play, without arresting or tranquillizing
it.'26 When played by technically skilled and imaginatively gifted players,
legal reasoning is neither a hubristic effort to bring the game to a perfect end
nor an irresponsible attempt to foment chaos; it is an infinitely variable process
in which there is never any ultimate victory or performance, but only the
repeated and unrepeatable working of the space between order and chaos,
freedom and constraint, and permanence and contingency.

Conclusion
In this essay, therefore, I have sought to show that it is well past time to

abandon Chief Justice Coke's claim that there is an 'artificial Reason and
Judgment of Law which requires long Study and Experience before a Man
can attain to the Cognizance of it.' This is a self-serving myth of lawyers,
judges and jurists that cannot be sustained as a descriptive truth or a
prescriptive claim and one to which Sunstein unwittingly contri butes. While
it is true that proficiency in legal reasoning, as with all other kinds of
reasoning, is something that is attained through 'long study and experience',

legal reasoning is not something that stands outside that practice, that
disciplines that practice, or that has an independent existence from it. There
is nothing more (or less) to legal reasoning than the practice of doing it. Again,
like other kinds of reasoning, it is only 'artificial' in that it is not given, but is
produced by the craft of its practitioners; it is elaborated, constituted and
changed through its contingent performance. Accordingly, the point of my
critique has not been to pin down some essential truths about legal argument,
but to understand better the playful practice of adjudication as its own
political practice and not as a reflection or embodiment of something else. I
maintain that this can be done by treating law's language as a deconstructive
game of philosophical i mprovisation that captures 'change, movement,
action, continuance, unlimited and unending possibility. •21
The beauty of such a non-formalist pragmatic approach is that it can both
recognise the way in which the game of adjudication is presently constituted
by these particular manoeuvres and, at the same time, accept that the game of
adjudication might come to be re-constituted by a transformed or entirely
different set of manoeuvres. The central claim, therefore, is not that law and
adjudication are reducible to this or any other set of game-defining rules, but
that some set of game-defining rules are in play that, however contingently
and temporarily, ensure that judicial players are both bound and free at one
and the same time. Within such a jurisprudential scenario, there are at least
two important insights that distinguish my non-formalist position from the
pseudo-pragmatism of Sunstein that there is no argument that brings debate
and disagreement to an end by sheer force of its own universal and cogent

force, and that there are no arguments whatsoever that do not owe their
existence and force to a particular context. What it means to get something
'right' is nothing more (and nothing less) than that a combination of
argumentative moves manages to persuade certain people for certain purposes
at a certain time and place of their persuasive merit. In law as so much else,
it's all in the game.
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